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The present paper aims to investigate the determinant factors of Portuguese merger 
control. Our sample comprises 652 M&A cases occurred between January of 2003 and 
September of 2015. Through a probit model we have tested the relevance of product and 
geographic market, entry barriers, type of concentration, merger effects, year of decision 
and the President of the Competition Authority at the time. The results suggests that the 
conglomerate and vertical effects, the existence of barriers to entry as well as the number 
of regulatory agencies listened are the main explanatory variables to determine a need for 
an in-depth investigation and to make a final decision. According to the evidence, cases 
cleared at Phase 1 are increasing over time. The number of prohibited mergers is close to 
zero. 
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Section 1. Introduction 
The main goal of this project is to investigate which are the main drivers that lead 
Autoridade da Concorrência (AdC), the Portuguese Competition Authority to take a 
decision whether a proposal of Merger & Acquisition (M&A) is approved in the first 
screening phase or in a second in depth investigation, with or without commitments.  
This is a timely and important issue. First, it is timely, because AdC is working for 
13 years and there are no previous studies on the field focusing on Portuguese data. 
Second, it is important because by knowing the predictable AdC's decisions, merging 
firms may optimize their intentions to merge in order to get the final approval, thus 
contributing for easier decisions of Competition Authority. 
Often, mergers are part of firms’ strategy to improve their competitive position in the 
market by optimizing resource allocation. Besides, it may also contribute for increase 
market power. On one hand, with efficiency gains, market becomes more competitive and 
challenging for the other firms, with consumers benefiting from higher quality goods at 
fairer prices. On the other hand, the strength of firms’ market power reduces competition, 
leading merging firms and also their competitors to set higher prices and harm consumers.  
Thus, the scrutiny of the authorities aligned with the Competition Law in force is an 
important tool for Competition Authorities around the world, in order to ensure that 
competition is bringing benefits for all parties in society: firms, competitors, suppliers 
and consumers. Portuguese Competition Authority follows the Law No 19/2012 of 8 May 
to take its decisions 
Under Competition Law, AdC has the power to prohibit merger agreements between 
firms, that may threaten competition in its relevant market (Art.9). Hence, to prevent anti-
competitive mergers, Competition Authorities assesses mergers. The starting point is a 
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screening phase, the so called Phase 1, when after 30 days a merger may be approved, 
approved subject to conditions or raise serious doubts. In the last case, AdC pursue for an 
in-depth investigation, Phase 2, to finally decide if the merger is outright approved, 
subjected to conditions or prohibited.  
We study under which circumstances the Authority decides to open a second phase 
investigation and also the factors that mostly explain the final decision through the 
application of two different probit models. 
Previous studies on European Commission (EC) decisions and also on FTC (Federal 
Trade Commission) in the US, have already used probit models to analyze each one of 
the questions.1 Their main findings point out barriers to entry, combined market shares, 
merger effects, i.e., conglomerate, vertical or horizontal effects, as the main determinants 
of Authorities’ final decisions. We propose to investigate the relevance of this variables 
in the Portuguese case and also the followings: influence of different Presidents of the 
Authority, relevant geographic and product market, and type of acquisition. Besides, we 
included a new variable representing the number of sectoral regulatory authorities to be 
listened when deciding on a case. Factors such as type of concentration, relevant product 
and geographic market as well as the President of Competition Authority are confirmed 
as not statistically significant.  
This paper is organized into sections as follows. Section 2 describes the existing 
literature on merger control. Section 3 presents the background of Portuguese Merger 
Control based on Competition Law. Section 4 explains the data and methodology 
                                                 
1 See for instance Duso et al, (2007), Bergman et al (2005) for EC decisions and Coate (1990) for FTC 
decisions, among many others. 
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employed and even how the model was built. Section 5 reports the discussion of results. 
Section 6 points out the main conclusions. 
Section 2. Literature Review  
The literature on mergers and the existence of merger control is quite extensive and 
addresses different questions.  
Among the main topics studied are firms’ incentives to merge, legal certainty and 
determinants of control decisions, the effectiveness of merger policy and also deterrent 
effects on future mergers. 
There are several reasons behind a merger decision. Among them, we find efficiency 
concerns, improvement of market power, better market discipline as well as advantage of 
diversification concerning risk management and the exploitation of internal capital 
markets. (Andrade et al., 2001). Moreover, mergers can be consequence of a reaction to 
the unexpected changes in the industry structures, since they tend to come in waves and 
cluster by industry (Mitchel & Mulherin, 1996). 
A merger may have two possible effects. First, it will enhance firms’ efficiency 
through the achievement of economies of scale and scope or other synergies. Thus, firms 
can reduce their production or distributions costs, contributing thereby for 
competitiveness of markets and also for consumers’ welfare, who may benefit from a 
better price to quality ratio in goods. However, with mergers, firms can also improve their 
market power and so, reduce competition, leading to inefficiencies either due to 
monopoly pricing or to the low incentives for cost control. As a result, in this case, 
consumers see their welfare decrease thanks to higher prices and low choice for products.  
(Davies & Lyons, 2007). 
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Effectively, a merger decision has impact not only in merging firms, but also in the 
other firms and consumers. Consequently, there is a need for merger control in order to 
boost the market dynamism, ensure the existence of competition and thus, preserve 
consumer welfare. (Duso et al., 2011). In fact, decisions based on consumer surplus may 
lead to higher social welfare than those based only on a welfare standard. (Neven & 
Roller, 2005).  
When a merger is proposed, the stock price for merging firms increase around the 
initial announcement date, as result of the expected increasing market power. Under 
anticompetitive mergers, rival firms on the market will also increase their market power 
due to the reduction of competition and so, their stock price may increase as well. By 
analyzing a sample of European mergers between 1990 and 2000, Aktas et al. (2007) 
found a decrease in rival firms’ stock price, concluding then, that mergers boosted 
industry competitiveness. Duso et al. (2011) assumed that an effective merger control 
decision is the one leading to a full gains reversal, i.e., where there is a negative relation 
between announcement and decision abnormal returns in stock prices. Overall, they 
conclude that remedies are more effective under no severe anticompetitive cases as well 
as if applied in Phase 1 or in remedy-intensive industries, i.e. industries that have an 
historical record on imposing remedies. Additionally, over the years, the imposition of 
commitments has increased rather than an integral prohibition. Remedies have avoid 
abuses of power without compromising efficiency gains, although anti-competitive rents 
have only been avoid by outright prohibitions. 
A study on merger remedies pursued by European Commission (DG Comp2005), 
which analyzes the design and implementation of 85 different remedies in 40 decisions 
between 1996 and 2000, confirms that commitments are mostly effective in Phase 1. 
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According to conclusions, 57% of remedies were effective, 24% raised some issues that 
were not solved during the implementation, 7% were ineffective and the remaining 12% 
unclear. In fact, by applying an easy remedy to implement, the Authority can avoid open 
a costly Phase 2. Moreover, the timing in which a decision is made can transmit some 
insights: if the decision is out earlier, it is a surprise to market; in opposite if there is a 
delay it is expected a harsh decision. 
When taking a decision, the Competition Authority can fall in two different errors, 
type I or type II. While type I errors occur when procompetitive processes are prohibited, 
type II errors occur when an anti-competitive merger is not prohibited. Under anti-
competitive mergers, firms gain market power and can set higher prices, benefiting at the 
expense of consumers. In contrast, firms can suffer with a pro-competitive that also have 
a negative impact on competitors but a positive one in consumer welfare. Duso et al. 
(2007) analyzed 167 merger control decisions in the European Union between 1990 and 
2002. Through the application of a probit regression, the authors considered political and 
institutional factors as drivers to an error, namely, the market definition, procedural 
aspects as well as country and industry effects. They found that commission made a type 
I error in 3 of the 14 prohibitions (21%) and a type II error in 23% of the cases that were 
cleared without commitments.  
There has been also literature analyzing the main determinants for merger control 
decisions concerning the opening of Phase 2 investigations and the final decisions.  
First, the probability to open a Phase 2 investigation is positively correlated with 
parties’ market shares, barriers to entry and the possibility of collusion after merger 
(Bergman et al, 2005). Second, the final decisions of Commission are mainly influenced 
by the nature of merger, i.e. if there are horizontal, vertical or conglomerate effects or 
8 
 
potential barriers to entry (Bergman et al, 2005 and Duso et al, 2007). However, there are 
other factors influencing the decision, namely the product and geographic relevant 
markets, the type of concentration (partial or full merger, joint venture, assets acquisition, 
and tender offer), the origin of merging firms, the Phase in which merger is cleared, 
combined market shares of merging firms, market size of competitors, as well as the 
policy of each President of the Authority. Duso et al. (2007) found that probability of an 
action decreases when there is an American firm involved or relevant market is defined 
as the European one. Whilst, it increases for manufacturing product market, full mergers 
(rather than partial), with the size of rival firms, under the presence of conglomerate or 
vertical effects, or when made between 1995 and 2002. 
In the United States the situation is not different and evidence on FTC merger 
decisions between 1982 and 1986 demonstrates the influence of barriers to entry, 
collusion effects and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) on final decisions (Coate, 
1990). 
There are yet studies focusing on the deterrent effect of a merger control, arguing that 
merger policy actions today affect the action of firms in the subsequent years. An effective 
and tough merger control policy should have a decreasing effect on the firms’ merger 
intentions (Sogard, 2009) and also make them to prefer vertical mergers that may increase 
efficiency, rather than horizontal ones (Seldeslachts et al., 2009). Actually, prohibitions 
reduce the number of anti-competitive merger notifications in the following periods. 
However, while prohibitions discourage future merger activity, remedies lead to a slight 
increase in subsequent years (Duso et al., 2010, 2015).  
The Competition Authorities benefits from higher bargaining power in initial stage 
of decision process, when merging firms hope to reach a quick deal, avoiding the higher 
9 
 
probability of interventions coming in the future. This way, remedies imposed in Phase 1 
may be costly to the firms and thereby, they have significant deterrence effect, rather than 
Phase 2 remedies and outright prohibitions (Duso et al, 2015). 
Several authors have raised concerns with withdrawn mergers. Duso et al. (2013) 
verified that after the Reform of European Merger Control (2004), prohibitions are 
decreasing as opposed to merger withdrawals that are increasing. Phase 1 withdrawn 
mergers may be explained by specific reasons of the merging firms (Duso et al., 2015), 
although when in Phase 2, the withdrawal signals strong objections made by Commission, 
and so, they may be considered as prohibitions (Bergman et al., 2005). 
Our approach is inspired on Bergman et al (2005) who studied the probability of open 
a phase 2 investigation and Duso et al (2007) who studied the probability of each final 
decision. 
First, this study analyzes the evolution of Portuguese merger control decisions over 
time by looking to the trends and possible deterrent effects in a more qualitative way, 
inspired by the findings of Duso et al (2015). Moreover, we will study if withdrawal 
mergers would have, in fact, high probability of be prohibited if they were not withdrawn.  
Second, we will look at the impact of variables concerning product and geographic 
market, type of merger and its effects as well as existence of barriers to entry in the 
relevant market in order to determine which ones are relevant to pursue for a Phase 2 or 
to make the final decision.  
In order to ensure that merger decisions do not suffer with differences in policy 
depending on who was leading the Competition Authority, we also consider differentiate 
decisions according to the President of Institution in respective time. Bergman et al. 
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(2015) have found no statistically significance for this factor, but it may not apply for 
European mergers in general, and apply for Portuguese ones in particular.   
Section 3. Portuguese Merger Control-Institutional Background 
Merger control in Portugal is ensured by Autoridade da Concorrência which is an 
independent regulatory entity working since 2003. Before, merger control was ensured 
by Direcção Geral da Concorrência e do Comércio, a government body. 
AdC aims to promote competition, an adequate level of innovation and the largest 
benefit to consumers through the enforcement of efficient market mechanisms.  
The Competition Policy in Portugal follows closely the European Commission 
Competition Rules, where there are two phases, the First Screening and then, if necessary 
the Second which is an in-depth investigation. Mergers involving a national dimension 
must be notified to Portuguese Competition Authority. 
According to Law No 19/2012 of 8 May, agreements between firms, concerted 
practices, abuses of dominant position, abuse of economic dependence and also state aid 
are prohibited activities; while concentrations are only allowed if they “do not create 
significant impediments to effective competition in the domestic market or a substantial 
part of it.” (Art. 9)  
A prior notification is needed when after merger, the combined market share of 
merging firms  is above 50% in domestic market or relevant part of it; if market share is 
between 30% and 50%  and two of the merging firms have turnover above 5 Million €, 
or even if the combined  turnover is above 100 Million € and two firms have turnover 
above 5 Million €. (Art. 37)  
After receiving the notification of concentration, the Authority has 30 working days 
(Art. 49) to take a decision-Phase1-whether the concentration is compatible with the 
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common market or not. If notifying party decide submit commitments in order to ensure 
the effective competition, the time limit is extended for 20 working days following the 
submission of commitments. (Art. 51). After, the preliminary investigation, the Authority 
can  then, state that the concentration does not fall within the scope of the procedure 
regarding control of concentrations between undertakings (Art. 50.1.a); clear the 
proposed merger if it does not create any impediment to effective competition (Art. 
50.1.b), decide to accept subject to the commitments presented (Art. 51)  or even to ask 
for a more in depth analysis-Phase 2(Art. 50. 1.c). In Phase 2, Authority uses 90 working 
days to finally decide whether to allow the concentration or to impose commitments or 
obligations (Art.53.1.a), or even to prohibit the merger (Art. 53.1.b).  Moreover, the 
notifying party can at any time withdraw the merger proposal (Art. 46). 
Figure 1 Timing of Portuguese Merger Control 
30 working dyas 90 working days 
  
    
Merger notification Phase 1 Decision Phase 2 Decision 
  approved approved 
  approved subject to 
conditions 
approved subject to 
conditions 
  withdrawn by the parties prohibited 
  raised serious 
doubtsPhase2 
withdrawn by the parties 
 
Section 4.  Data and Methodology 
The data was gathered from Portuguese Competition Authority base and completed 
with the public information available. 
Between January of 2003 and September of 2015, there was 720 proposed mergers 
notified to the Portuguese Competition Authority. Among these, in Phase 1 were 
approved without commitments 604 mergers and 18 with commitments, despite one 
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single prohibition. There were 34 cases needing an in-depth investigation of which 6 were 
approved outright, 15 were cleared subject to commitments, 5 prohibited and even 8 cases 
withdrawn by the notifying party. (See Table 1) 
Portuguese Competition Law (Law no 19/2012) does not provide merger prohibitions 
on Phase 1. The prohibited merger in Phase 1 is thus, an exception. It corresponds to the 
process 41/2009on Portuguese Competition Authority database, which is a joint control 
acquisition of Grupo Media Capital SGPS, S.A by Ongoing Media, SGPS, S.A and 
Vertix, SGPS, S.A. 2  The case focus on Television sector and so, according to Article 55 
of Law no 19/2012, the Authority may ask the respective regulatory entities, namely, the 
Regulating Authority for the Media (Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social-
ERC) and National Authority for Communications Regulation (Autoridade Nacional das 
Comunicações -ANACOM). While ANACOM provided a favorable opinion, ERC did 
not. Taking into account that according to Article 4.2 of applicable Television Law at the 
time (Law 32/2003), the regulatory entity delivers a binding opinion, the Competition 
Authority was forced to not allow the merger, in Phase 1. 
To the purpose of this study, we do not consider the merger prohibited in Phase 1, 
cases withdrawn in Phase 1 (6), the cases forwarded to the European Commission (3), 
neither the cases out of the procedure regarding the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (47).  (See Table 1) 
We end up so, with 659 merger cases considering the 8 Phase 2 withdrawals and 651, 
otherwise. 
                                                 




Figure 2 shows the total number of merger notified to the Portuguese Competition 
Authority.  It is possible verify that number vary among the years, despite the downward 
trend. The high number of notifications (82) was achieved in 2005. Almost all the merger 
cases notified have been decided on Phase 1 as opposed to Phase 2 cases that are close to 
zero and even present a decreasing trend. 
Figure 2 Notified Merger Cases and Investigations per phase over time 
 
Figure 3 presents the yearly merger-policy actions imposed by the AdC, namely 
Phase 1 remedies, Phase 2 remedies, Phase 2 prohibitions, Phase 2 withdrawals. Actions 
corresponds to the sum of the other four variables. There is no evident correlation between 
each different merger policy action. Although, when comparing to figure 2 we see that 
merger policy action seem to be correlated with the number of notified mergers among 
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Figure 3 Merger Actions over time 
 
The Authority’s data provide in-depth information regarding characteristics of the 
merger and decisions. In order to apply an econometric model, the information was 
converted into variables, most of them in dummies.  
The main economic variables influencing a merger decision are based on the nature 
of merger (pure horizontal, “vertical” or with “conglomerate" effects) (Bergman et al, 
2005); the type of concentration (“full” acquisition, assets acquisition, Joint Venture-
“JV”, “tender” offer or even a “partial” merger), and also the relevant markets. While 
geographic market is divided into Portugal (“pt”), European Economic Area and 
worldwide; product market is analyzed, considering whether the process is related to an 
attractive industry for M&A. We consider the industry sectors raised by Schoenberg & 
Reeves (1999) and Setar (2012) that are in line with the ones considered by Duso et al. 
(2007). In order to do so, firstly we identify the activity sectors for each process, 
according to the Portuguese code for economic activities-CAE (Classificação das 
Actividades Económicas). Afterwards, we construct dummy variables for 
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Resources (CAE D and E) and Transport (CAE H) and Pharmaceutical Industry (CAE 
C1). Then, we also include a variable with the number of sectoral regulatory authorities 
(sectreg) that Competition Authority has to listen per each case. 
 In addition to this, we have dummy variables identifying who was the President of 
Competition Authority for each decision. Abel Mateus led the institution since its 
establishment in 2003 until March of 2008, followed by Manuel Sebastião (“ms”) until 
September of 2013, when António Gomes (“ag”) took up his functions. 
In order to ensure that influence of President of Competition Authority in decision is 
not reflection of evolution among the years, we add a variable “year” in place of “ms” 
and “ag” in a second model. 
We start by applying a simple probit regression with the purpose of determine the 
probability to open a Phase 2 investigation. The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
“Phase2” assuming a value of 0 when the process is decided on Phase 1 (failure) or a 
value of 1 if the process is only decided on a Phase 2 investigation (success). It will be 
constructed two models with slight differences on explanatory variables. In Model 1 we 
will consider the variables “ms” and “ag”, while in Model 2, we will consider “year”. All 
the remaining explanatory variables hold for both models. In the end, we will analyze 
what are the variables statistically significant at 5% and include them in a final model-
Model 3-that accurately explains the determinant variables of a Phase 2 investigation. 
After achieving the final set of explanatory variables, it is important to bear in mind 
that coefficients from the probit models cannot be directly interpreted. The marginal 
effects are then computed, in order to effectively understand how relevant variables 
predict the opening of a Phase 2 investigation. 
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Second, we use an ordered probit model taking as dependent variable “Decision” in 
the order 1, 2, 3, to determine the probability of a merger be approved outright (1), 
approved with commitments (2) or prohibited (3). 
Again, we will construct a Model 4 with “ms” and “ag” as explanatory variables and 
a Model 5 with “year” beyond all the other variables as barriers to entry, mergers’ effects, 
mergers’ type, relevant product and geographic market as well as the number of 
regulatory agencies listened. Here, we also include a dummy “Phase 2” as an explanatory 
variable with the purpose of differentiate between decisions taken on Phase 1 or Phase 2. 
Afterwards, we end up by constructing a final Model 6 with all the variables considered 
as relevant to predict the probability of a final decision. 
In addition we, present an enlarged Model 6, which includes the 8 cases withdrawn 
in Phase 2 in order to verify if there are considerable differences between the two models, 
otherwise this cases were really likely to suffer by severe decisions if it continue in the 
market. 
Section 5. Discussion of Results 
Table 3 exhibits the main results for the probit models calculated. The first three 
models (Model 1, 2 and 3) correspond to the probability of a process being decided on 
the Phase 2 while the remaining three (Model 4, 5 and 6) predict the probability of a 
merger being approved, approved subject to conditions, or prohibited. 
First, we verify that all the cases within European geographic market or related to the 
Pharmaceutical Industry were approved without conditions in Phase 1. Therefore, 
variables “C” and “eea” are disregarded in the models. Moreover, all the partial merges 
were approved without conditions and so, the variable “partial” is not included in Model 
4 and followings. 
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Second, in all the models, the dummy variables used to identify the type of 
concentration and either the relevant product or geographic markets are not statistically 
significant at 5%. Therefore, they are not considered as relevant to pursue for a Phase 2 
investigation or to make a final decision on the merger approval.  
Third, while in Model 1, the variables “ms” and “ag” are relevant at 5 and 10% 
significance level, respectively, in Model 2 the variable “year” is relevant for 1% level. 
This way, we have assumed that the need for an in-depth investigation has been 
decreasing over the years, but not only due to different Presidents. 
Focusing on model 2, we see that the probability of Phase 2 investigations is 
explained by the “year”, the existence of “barriers” to entry in the market, the 
“conglomerate” and “vertical” effects of a merger and also by the number of regulatory 
agencies (“sectreg”) that AdC has to call. These variables are employed in Model 3, in 
order to predict this probability accurately. When analyzing the respective marginal 
effects (see Table 4), we conclude that as we move forward one year the probability of 
being decided on Phase 1 increases by 0,4%. Moreover, a merger with conglomerate 
effects is 1,5 percentage points (pp) more likely to be decided on Phase 1 while a merger 
with vertical effects is 7,9 pp more likely to be decided on Phase 2. In addition, markets 
with high barriers to entry make the Phase 2 more likely in 3,6percentage points. In its 
turn, the probability of an in-depth investigation increases by 2,1% per each regulatory 
agency that Competition Authority listens. 
This way, we conclude, that cases notified are even more cleared in Phase 1, which 
is desirable for both of the parties. Competition Authority benefits from higher bargaining 
power and merging firms have less probability of suffer an action by the Authority. 
Furthermore, mergers between firms operating in unrelated business, i.e., with 
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conglomerate effects, seems to not be a big threat to competition and for that reason are 
easily approved in the Phase 1; notwithstanding the vertical mergers tend to need an in-
depth investigation, in order to ensure that the effects will increase efficiency and not 
compromise competition and consumer welfare. What is more, the number of external 
entities listened may signal the complexity of the case and so, when they are higher, the 
decision is likely to be made in Phase 2. Mergers in markets with high barriers to entry 
may compromise competition, since the increase of market power by firms cannot be 
offset by new entrants. Thus, in order to prevent anti-competitive mergers, it is more 
likely to pursue for Phase 2 investigations under the existence of high barriers to enter in 
the market. 
Overall the probability of a case be decided on Phase 1 is 98,7% while for Phase 2 is 
equal to 1,3%. 
Model 4 and 5 present the probability of each final decision taken by the Competition 
Authority. At first sight, when all the variables are considered, we verify that the ones 
analyzing the type of concentration, product market and geographic market continue to 
not be relevant for both models. Moreover, the variables “ms” and “ag” (in model 4) as 
well as “year” (in model 5) are not statistically significant. 
In the end, we obtain Model 6 with the following main drivers for AdC’s decision: 
“Phase2”, “barriers”, “vertical”, “conglomerate” and “sectreg”.By analyzing the marginal 
effects after the ordered probit model, we conclude that when a case is decided in Phase 
2, the probability of being approved without commitments is lower in almost 60 pp while 
the probability of impose a commitment is higher in 54pp and a prohibition is more likely 
in 6pp. The conglomerate and vertical effects increase the probability of a decision be 
approved outright in 2,5% and 1,6%, respectively. The probability of impose a 
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commitment increases by 3% per each regulatory entity listened. In what concerns 
prohibition decision, the variables take tiny values, but it is possible to verify in one hand, 
a positive correlation with variables: “Phase 2” and “sectreg”,  and in the other hand, a 
negative one with conglomerate or vertical effects, which induces that horizontal mergers 
increase the probability to block a merger. 
Again, high barriers to entry and the existence of horizontal concerns in a merger are 
conditions to improve market power and so, compromise competition, resulting on severe 
decisions. 
Overall, according to the ordered probit model estimated for a 5% significance level, 
the probability of the Portuguese Competition Authority approves a merger is around 
98,6%, and 1,4% of approve without commitments. The decision to prohibit is close to 
zero, due to the low and decreasing number of prohibitions. 
Model 6 enlarged (see Table 4) considers withdrawn cases as prohibitions. When 
comparing to regular Model 6 we do not see significant differences in marginal effects, 
thereby we believe that if these cases were not withdrawn, they would raise critical issues 
and would undergo an intervention. 
Section 6. Conclusions 
The objective of this report was to provide econometric evidence on relevant factors 
that draw a pattern on merger control decisions taken by Portuguese Competition 
Authority. It was considered 651 M&A processes, between January of 2013 and 
September of 2015, and respective information collected, regarding their characteristics, 




First, it is clear that most of the decisions passed by Competition Authority are 
decided with no conditions in the first Phase (93%). In opposition, prohibitions of a 
merger are rare in Portugal (1%) and the imposition of remedies has been decreasing. 
However, in the second phase, 8 cases were withdrawn by the notifying parties, otherwise 
the probability to suffer an intervention (even a prohibition) would be higher. 
Second, we found that number of sectoral regulatory agencies listened to solve a case 
is really relevant to determine the need to open a Phase 2 investigation and also to 
determine which is final outcome of decisions. Actually it may reflects the complexity of 
the market in study and can be used more times. 
Third, econometric evidence on estimations of probability to open a Phase 2, 
confirmed not only the relevance of barriers to entry and both vertical and horizontal 
effects, but also the annual decreasing tendency of pursue for in-depth investigations. 
Forth, the ordered probit model of decision, also confirmed the relevance of variables 
as high barriers to entry and horizontal effects to define severe decisions. Moreover, in 
phase 2, Competition Authority tend to intervene more in merger cases. 
Therefore, mergers between firms operating in related business with higher barriers 
to entry and subject to the opinion of more sectoral regulatory agencies are likely to need 
a longer and more detailed investigation. Moreover, it is more likely to get the outright 
approval on a non-horizontal merger made in a Phase 1 without relevant barriers to entry 
and with low number of regulatory entities listened. In contrast, it is more likely that 
commitments are imposed on a horizontal merger within a market with high barriers to 
entry which requires the opinion of several regulatory agencies and if it is in the Phase 2. 
Fifth, the probability of merger be cleared on Phase 1 is increasing over time whilst 
the probability of a remedy be imposed in a merger is higher in Phase 2. 
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Finally, it is important to notice that there is no influence of product and geographic 
markets, type of concentration and further AdC’s president, which indicates that decisions 
are not biased by political pressure (Mai, 2014), 
To conclude we can verify that our main findings are in line with the literature review. 
Although, it is not possible to conclude whether decisions were appropriated or not.  
In order to get strongest econometric results, more quantitative factors should be 
considered in future investigations, namely the firms’ turnover and combined market 




Section 7. Appendix 
Table 1 Cases notified to Portuguese Competition Authority and respective decision over the years 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
[Phase 1] No of cases notified 56 48 82 67 81 65 52 62 48 61 39 44 15 720 
Cases withdrawn 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 6 
outside AdC jurisdiction 13 3 6 6 4 2 5 1 3 4 1 2 0 50 
sent to Commission 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
[Phase 1] Relevant Cases 36 40 69 56 74 63 45 59 41 55 37 37 14 626 
approved without conditions 35 38 68 56 70 59 44 55 40 55 36 37 14 604 
approved subject to conditions 1 2 1 0 4 4 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 18 
prohibited 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
[Phase 2] Proocedings initiated 4 5 7 4 2 2 1 1 3 2 1 2 0 34 
Cases withdrawn 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 8 
[Phase 2] Relevant Cases 3 4 6 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 26 
approoved without conditions 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 6 
approved subject to conditions 3 2 2 4 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 15 
prohibited 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 
[Total]Relevant Cases 39 44 75 60 76 64 46 60 42 56 38 38 14 652 
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Table 2 Preliminary Statistics 
  
Variable Description Obs Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Max 
phase2 Dummy=1 if the merger process was cleared 
in Phase 2 
651 0,040 0,196 0 1 
decision =1 if the merger is approved without 
conditions 
=2 if the merger is approved subject to 
conditions 
=3 if the merger is prohibited 
651 1,066 0,278 1 3 
Merger Effects 
vertical Dummy=1 if there are vertical effects 
resulting of merger 
651 0,054 0,226 0 1 
conglomerate Dummy=1 if there are conglomerate effects 
resulting of merger 
651 0,332 0,471 0 1 
Concentration´s type 
full Dummy=1 if the concentration was a full 
merger 
651 0,714 0,452 0 1 
jv Dummy=1 if the concentration was a joint 
venter 
651 0,100 0,300 0 1 
tender Dummy=1 if the concentration was a tender 
offer 
651 0,015 0,123 0 1 
partial Dummy=1 if the concentration was a partial 
merger 
651 0,017 0,129 0 1 
Geographic and Product Market 
pt Dummy=1 if the relevant geographic market 
is national 
651 0,717 0,451 0 1 
eea Dummy=1 if the relevant geographic market 
is the European Economic Area 
651 0,112 0,316 0 1 
C Dummy=1 if the relevant product market is 
within Pharmaceutical Industry sector (CAE 
C1) 
651 0,045 0,206 0 1 
J Dummy=1 if the relevant product market is 
within Telecommunication sector (CAE J) 
651 0,108 0,310 0 1 
K Dummy=1 if the relevant product market is 
within  Financial Intermediation sector (CAE 
K) 
651 0,066 0,249 0 1 
DE Dummy=1 if the relevant product market is 
within Energy and Water Resources sector 
(CAE D and E) 
651 0,117 0,321 0 1 
H Dummy=1 if the relevant product market is 
within Transport sector (CAE H) 
651 0,115 0,320 0 1 
Other Variables      
barriers Dummy=1 if there are high level of entry 
barriers in the market 
651 0,204 0,403   
sectreg Number of sectoral regulatory authorities that 
AdC call on in order to take a decision 
651 0,237 0,517 0 3 
Ms Dummy=1 if the President of AdC at the 
decision time was Manuel Sebastião 
651 0,763 0,425 0 1 
Ag Dummy=1 if the President of AdC at the 
decision time was António Gomes 
651 0,118 0,323 0 1 
Year Year at which the merger is notified 651 2008,367 3,316 2003 2015 
24 
 
Table 3. Probit Models 
Dependent Variable phase2 decision 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
phase2 ---  --- 2,729*** 2,687*** 2,543 
 ---  --- (0,371) (0,376) (0,337) 
year --- -0,138*** -0,132 --- -0,021 --- 
 --- (0,043) (0,040) --- (0,037) --- 
ms -0,532** --- --- 0,125 --- --- 
 (0,255) --- --- (0,246) --- --- 
ag 0,972* --- --- -0,643 --- --- 
 (0,552) --- --- (0,616) --- --- 
barriers 0,851*** 0,773*** 0,673 0,721*** 0,702*** 0,755 
 (0,227) (0,232) (0,213) (0,234) (0,233) (0,213) 
conglomerate -0,551** -0,541** -0,533 -1,066** -1,094** -0,859 
 (0,361) (0,375) (0,346) (0,449) (0,452) (0,391) 
vertical 0,791** 0,949* 0,947 -1,488*** -1,603*** -1,256 
 (0,363) (0,372) (0,336) (0,631) (0,624) (0,557) 
full -0,216 -0,192 --- -0,178 -0,205 --- 
 (0,306) (0,317) --- (0,301) (0,299) --- 
jv 0,002 -0,048 --- 0,602 0,516 --- 
 (0,424) (0,438) --- (0,407) (0,405) --- 
tender 0,051 0,070 --- -1,275 -1,329 --- 
 (0,708) (0,7) --- (0,977) (0,97) --- 
partial 0,449 0,486 --- --- --- --- 
 (0,699) (0,703) --- --- --- --- 
pt 0,822* 0,883* --- 0,550 0,532 --- 
 (0,452) (0,471) --- (0,421) (0,418) --- 
J 0,221 0,136 --- -0,480 -0,425 --- 
 (0,423) (0,439) --- (0,526) (0,52) --- 
K -0,386 -0,440 --- -0,743 -0,622 --- 
 (0,53) (0,541) --- (0,582) (0,561) --- 
DE 1,064* -1,082 --- 0,140 0,184 --- 
 (0,575) (0,574) --- (0,383) (0,382) --- 
Ht 0,302 0,286 --- 0,231 0,286 --- 
 (0,335) (0,34) --- (0,339) (0,331) --- 
sectreg 0,642*** 0,699** 0,654 0,792*** 0,762*** 0,543 
 (0,23) (0,235) (0,153) (0,24) (0,235) (0,144) 
Pseudo R2 0,2499 0,319 0,2540 0,513 0,5070 0,46 
Log likelihood  -77,054 -74,322 -81,465 -77,803 -78,685 -86,135 
Observations 651 651 651 651 651 651 
The symbols *,**,*** represent significance at 10,5 and 1%, respectively 
Standard errors are represented in parenthesis. 
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Table 4 Marginal Effects  















 Model 6 Model 6 enlarged 
 P(decision)=1 P(decision)=2 P(decision)=3 P(decision)=1 P(decision)=2 P(decision)=3 
phase2 -0,587 0,535 0,052 -0,769 0,519 0,250 
 (0,127) (0,117) (0,035) (0,083) (0,081) (0,074) 
barriers -0,046 0,045 0,0002 -0,037 0,037 0,0009 
 (0,019) (0,019) (0,0004) (0,019) (0,019) (0,001) 
conglomerate 0,025 -0,025 -0,00007 0,026 -0,026 -0,0005 
 (0,009) (0,009) (0,0001) (0,011) (0,011) (0,0005) 
vertical 0,016 -0,016 -0,00003 -0,026 -0,026 -0,0003 
 (0,007) (0,007) (0,00005) (0,008) (0,008) (0,0003) 
sectreg -0,0193 0,019 0,00005 -0,021 0,021 0,0004 
 (0,008) (0,008) (0,00008) (0,008) (0,008) (0,0004) 
P(decision) 0,986 0,0139 0,00002295 0,978 0,022 0,00025 
n 651 651 651 659 659 659 
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